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Abstract
Psychological reactance theory posits that when people are faced with threats to, or elimination of, behavioral freedom, they experience
an aversive motivational state (i.e., psychological reactance). Recent research indicates that people’s state of mind affects reactance
arousal processes. We hypothesized that being in a state of threatening uncertainty would cause people to experience less psychological reactance to a freedom-threatening communication than those in a state of certainty. We randomly assigned 114 students from a
North American University to an uncertainty- or certainty-inducing recall task; they were then exposed to a reactance-arousing
message. Compared to participants primed to feel certain, those primed with threatening uncertainty reported significantly less threat
and more positive attitudes in response to a freedom threatening communication. Mediation analysis revealed an indirect effect of
feelings of threatening uncertainty on people’s behavioral intentions, through perceptions of the controlling message. Results support
our hypothesis: people in a state of uncertainty experience less psychological reactance than those in a state of certainty.
Keywords Attitudes . Freedom . Psychological reactance . Reactance . Uncertainty

Psychological reactance theory (PRT; Brehm 1966; Brehm &
Brehm 1981) posits that freedom of behavior is essential to
people’s survival because it allows them to choose the best
ways to fulfill their most pressing needs. When people have
experiences that threaten or eliminate this freedom, psychological reactance is aroused; this motivational state pushes
them to restore the lost freedom. Based on this assumption,
PRT makes a range of predictions about the characteristics of
freedoms and threats to freedom that maximize reactance
arousal, as well as the ways in which people seek to regain
their lost freedom. A vast array of experimental investigations
(e.g., Andreoli et al. 1974; Brehm & Cole 1966; Dillard &
Shen 2005; Sittenthaler et al. 2015) have illustrated the utility
of PRT in explaining thought and action in numerous contexts
(e.g., clinical psychology, Beutler et al. 2002; health
communication, Quick et al. 2013). More recently, scholars
have begun to detail the motivational and emotional states that
moderate reactance processes (e.g., empathy; Shen 2010). The
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aim of the current study was to add to this growing body of
research—most notably, by investigating the ways in which
threatening uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty that is aversive,
arousing insecurity and anxiety; Haas & Cunningham 2014;
Hart 2014; Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler 2011) influences responses to freedom threatening messages.

Psychological Reactance Theory
Psychological reactance theory assumes that freedom of behavior is an important, beneficial, and pervasive aspect of
people’s lives; it also assumes that people have a set of specific free behaviors in which they believe they can engage
(Brehm 1966). Related to these assumptions, Brehm suggested that when something threatens or eliminates people’s
freedom, they become motivated to restore it—this motivation
is called psychological reactance (Brehm 1966; Brehm &
Brehm 1981). Led by communication scholars, researchers
have broken PRT into components and modeled it based on
proposed order of occurrence (Dillard & Shen 2005; Quick
et al. 2013): 1) perceived freedom, 2) perceived threat to freedom, 3) reactance, and 4) restoration of freedom (Brehm &
Brehm 1981; Quick et al. 2013).
In the 20 years following Brehm’s (1966) proposal of PRT,
considerable research examined the theory’s core tenets using
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a paradigm in which participants’ freedom to do something
was established (e.g., “choose any candy bar”), and then restricted (e.g., “your choice is no longer available”). The framework received broad empirical support from a host of studies
(e.g., Andreoli et al. 1974; Brehm & Cole 1966; Mazis 1975;
Wicklund et al. 1970), as well as the attention of several reviews (Brehm & Brehm 1981; Burgoon et al. 2002; Quick
et al. 2013). Following Brehm and Brehm’s (1981) review
of PRT, scholarship continued, but the focus shifted away
from basic research (Quick et al. 2013), and moved toward
applied scholarship in clinical psychology (for review see
Beutler et al. 2002) and health communication (for reviews
see Burgoon et al. 2002; Quick et al. 2013). In addition to this
applied research, prominent PRT scholars (e.g., Steindl
et al. 2015; Wright et al. 2015) have recently reemphasized
the motivational qualities of reactance, suggesting that a continued return to PRT’s motivational roots will allow researchers to push the theory forward, both in terms of its
accuracy and applicability (for further discussion see
Rosenberg & Siegel 2018).

Factors Affecting Reactance Arousal
Part of this effort to refocus PRT scholarship on its motivational
underpinnings has reinvigorated a body of work that began over
30 years ago—namely, investigations of motivational and emotional states that influence reactance arousal. This stream of
research started with Wortman and Brehm (1975), whose theorizing indicated that reactance arousal may not occur in the same
manner for all people. Specifically, these authors suggested that
learned helplessness (i.e., failure to escape aversive stimuli)
occurs when people’s efforts to restore a lost freedom are continually unsuccessful, leading them to stop experiencing reactance and the accompanying motivation to regain the lost freedom (for review see Brehm & Brehm 1981). Taking this logic a
bit further, Brehm and Brehm (1981) argued that any number of
trait variables could influence reactance processes, including
locus of control (Rotter 1966), Type A personality (e.g.,
Rhodewalt & Comer 1982), and self-consciousness (e.g.,
Carver & Scheier 1981).
Aside from a few notable exceptions (e.g., sensation
seeking, Quick & Stephenson 2008), research on these traitlevel moderators has mostly waned (for review see Moreira
et al. 2021). However, a burgeoning area of PRT research, and
the focus of the current study, examines ways in which different motivational and emotional states can curtail or amplify
people’s reactions to freedom threats (e.g., obsessive passion,
Belanger et al. 2020; empathy, Shen 2010). Indeed, several
recent lines of research support the idea that motivational and
emotional states also affect reactance processes (for review
and discussion see Rosenberg & Siegel 2018). For instance,
Lienemann and Siegel (2015) found that even though an autonomy supportive ad caused less reactance among people

with lower levels of depressive symptomology than a direct
ad, people with higher levels of depressive symptomology
were equally reactant to both the autonomy-supportive and
the controlling language message (Study 1). Conversely,
data from Schüz et al. (2013) showed that providing participants with a chance to self-affirm reduced reactance arousal; Shen (2010, 2011) similarly showed that messageinduced empathy allays reactance arousal. Taken together,
this nascent body of findings has revealed several motivational and emotional states that increase (e.g., depression)
and diminish (e.g., self-affirmation and empathy) reactance
arousal.
In line with these recent data, we propose that threatening
uncertainty is an additional motivational state that moderates
people’s perceptions of freedom threats. Backing for this idea
comes from a variety of theoretical and empirical sources. First,
25 years before Brehm (1966) proposed PRT, Fromm (1941)
theorized that even though some freedom is good, too much
freedom leads people to feel threatened, insecure, and uncertain. Fromm offered two primary means by which people allay
the feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty that are associated
with increasing freedom: membership in a solid, cohesive
group and submitting to an authoritarian leader. Each strategy
“promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom” (p. 36). Thus, while Brehm (1966) was
clear that people do not seek out freedom, instead of becoming
reactant when faced with freedom threats, Fromm (1941) suggested that there are contexts where people may seek out situations that PRT would characterize as freedom threats (e.g.,
proscriptive leaders). Indeed, it seems that Fromm was unknowingly describing a time when psychological reactance
should not be expected in response to a freedom threat—that
is, when people feel threatened, insecure, and uncertain.
Fromm was not an empiricist, but researchers have tested
the assumption that people sometimes seek out situations that
PRT would characterize as freedom-threatening in a variety of
literatures (e.g., Group-Based Control Model, Fritsche et al.
2011; uncertainty identity theory, Hogg 2000, 2007; compensatory control theory, Kay et al. 2008). Uncertainty identity
theory (UIT) indicates that when people feel uncertain about
their perceptions, attitudes, values, or about themselves, they
experience discomfort, which in turn motivates them to regain
certainty (Hogg 2007). In support of UIT, experimental evidence suggests that when people are uncertain about who they
are, they seek the structure of a group that prescribes what they
should think, feel, and do because it reduces their subjective
uncertainty (e.g., Rast et al. 2013). Similar evidence comes
from Kay et al.’s (2008, 2009) work on compensatory control
theory (CCT), which contends that people have a strong need
for control; as a result, in the face of threats to this control, they
will restore it using any number of means. According to this
view, one particularly effective and widespread strategy for
regaining the perception of control is to endorse external

Curr Psychol

systems (e.g., religion, government) that make the world seem
orderly and structured (for review see Kay et al. 2015).

The Current Study
In line with this thinking, the current study sought to add to the
recent and renewed focus on motivational and emotional states
that affect reactance arousal by assessing whether threatening
uncertainty influences people’s responses to freedom threats. If
Fromm’s (1941) theorizing was accurate, and times of threatening uncertainty represent occasions where people desire orderly, external systems (e.g., Kay et al. 2008, 2009) and structured groups (e.g., Hogg et al. 2007), it follows that times of
threatening uncertainty should influence the amount of reactance that freedom threats arouse. Our broad hypothesis was
that if people desire structure and order when they feel threatening uncertainty (Fromm 1941), when faced with a freedom
threatening message, they should experience less reactance
than those who feel certain.
More specifically, we predicted that those primed to feel
threatening uncertainty would report less perceived threat
(H1a) and anger (H1b), as well as more positive attitudes
(H1c) in response to a freedom threatening communication
than those primed to feel certain. Although PRT studies have
found inconsistent effects of reactance primes on people’s
freedom restoration intentions (e.g., Dillard & Shen 2005;
for a discussion Quick et al. 2013), we predicted that participants primed to feel threatening uncertainty would report less
intentions to contact the University President (i.e., to restore
their freedom) than those primed to feel certain (H2).

Method
Design and Participants
Participants were first randomly assigned to complete an autobiographical recall task (e.g., D’Mello & Mills 2014) designed to arouse feelings of uncertainty or certainty (see
Appendix 1 for full text). Subsequently, we presented all participants with a freedom-threatening message saying that the
administration at their University was considering a policy
that would severely limit their choice in class selection (see
Appendix 2 for full text). We then assessed reactance using
self-report measures of behavioral intentions, anger, perceived
threat, and attitudes toward the policy.
Based on parameters chosen from prior PRT research (for a
meta-analysis see Rains 2013), we conducted an analysis
using G*power (Faul et al. 2007) to determine a target sample
size of 98 participants (alpha = .05, power = .95, effect size
f2 = .12). In line with prior data collection, we aimed to collect
an additional 20 participants to account for missing data,

outliers (univariate and multivariate), those who fail manipulation and attention checks (~10%), and those who do not
follow writing task instructions (for a similar approach
see Straszewski & Siegel 2018).
Participants were 127 undergraduate students who received
extra credit for completing the study. A key contention of PRT
is that people will only be reactant when a freedom threat
addresses an important attitude or behavior. Thus,
we recruited undergraduate students here because we figured
that class selection—and the restriction thereof—would be
important and engaging to most of our sample. That is, both
methodologically and theoretically, this approach maximized
the chances that our sample would be invested in the study and
experience reactance.
Analyses omitted 13 participants for failing to complete the
written portion of the manipulation (n = 3) or being multivariate outliers (n = 10; see Tabachnick & Fidell 2019), which
left a final sample of 114. The sample had an average age of
20.08 years (SD = 2.73) and was 78% female (22% male). The
ethnic breakdown was as follows: 54.4% White/Caucasian,
25.4% Asian, 11.4% Hispanic, 0.9% African American, and
7.9% Other. All participants were full-time students; their
class standing was as follows: 14% seniors, 21.1% juniors,
37.7% sophomores, and 27.2% freshmen.
Uncertainty Manipulation To induce threatening uncertainty/
certainty, we asked participants to detail a recent uncertain or
certain experience in two separate textboxes that appeared
below the manipulation prompts (for a similar approach see
Straszewski & Siegel 2018). In the first textbox, we instructed
participants to avoid writing about their feelings around the
uncertain or certain experience, instead detailing the event, “as
if you were a journalist focusing on the specific details of what
occurred.” Moreover, we asked participants specifically about
a time when they were so uncertain that they felt “vulnerable
and threatened.” This distinction was line with research by
Haas and Cunningham (2014), who suggested that uncertainty
that is accompanied by threat is negative, while uncertainty
that is not accompanied by threat is often positive (e.g.,
challenging; Blascovich 2008; Fritsche et al. 2011; Tomaka
et al. 1993).
On the following page, participants saw a second textbox,
into which we asked them to describe “how you felt at the time
of the event… try to re-experience the emotions that you felt at
the time of the event” (see Appendix 1 for full text). Research
suggests that autobiographical recall tasks are effective as
short and easily disseminated mood inductions (e.g.,
D’Mello & Mills 2014). This specific autobiographical recall
task was adapted from Hogg and colleagues’ (Hogg
et al. 2007; Sherman, Hogg & Maitner 2009; Smith, Hogg,
Martin & Terry 2007) research on UIT (for a similar approach
also see van Prooijen 2016), which showed that inductions
like these made people feel subjectively uncertain.
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Message After completing the uncertainty task, participants
were presented with a controlling message purporting to remove student choice in class selection. In line with research by
Miller et al. (2007) and Dillard and Shen (2005), we designed
the message to eliminate student choice and elicit maximum
reactance. The message stated, in part, “The freedom of choice
students used to enjoy will no longer exist. If the administration approves this plan, all [School] students would be forced
to declare their major by second semester freshman year…
You will no longer be the final decision maker when it comes
to your course schedule” (see Appendix 2 for full text).

class selection policy;” “I will consider contacting [School]‘s
President about this class selection policy;” and “I intend to
contact [School]‘s President about this class selection policy.”
This measure is in line with Dillard and Shen’s (2005) measure of flossing intentions, which had adequate levels of
reliability in those studies (α = .83 to .87).
Demographics Participants also reported their age, gender,
and race/ethnicity, as well as their class standing and student
status.

Measures

Results

Perceived Threat To assess the amount of threat the proposed
policy aroused, we used four items adapted from Dillard and
Shen (2005): “The class selection policy threatens my freedom to choose;” “The class selection policy tries to make a
decision for me;” “The class selection policy tries to manipulate me;” and “The class selection policy tries to pressure me.”
Participants rated all items on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Across two studies, Dillard
and Shen found that this measure adequately captured differences between controlling and supportive messages, and that
it had acceptable levels of reliability (α = .83 to .87).

Raw data are available on the Open Science Framework and
can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2YK7Odx. Prior to running
statistical analyses, data were assessed for outliers and
violations of normality. Perceived threat (α = .81), anger
toward the policy (α = .94), attitudes toward the policy (α = .
93), and intentions to contact the President (α = .89) met the
univariate assumptions of the analyses. We used a series of
univariate ANCOVAs to our hypotheses, which held that
those primed to feel threatening uncertainty would report
less perceived threat (H1a) and anger (H1b), as well as more
positive attitudes (H1c), than those primed to feel certain; and
H2, which held that participants primed to feel threatening
uncertainty would report less intentions to contact the
President than those primed to feel certain (see Table 1 for
means and SDs).

Anger toward the Message To assess participants’ level of
anger toward the class selection policy, we included Dillard
and Shen’s (2005) measure of anger; it is a four-item scale that
asked participants how “irritated,” “angry,” “annoyed,” and
“aggravated” they felt at the message. Participants responded
on a 7-point scale, with anchors of 1 = None of this feeling and
7 = A great deal of this feeling. As Rains (2013) noted in a
meta-analysis, this scale has received considerable empirical
support, and shows adequate levels of reliability (α = .92 to
.94).
Attitudes toward the Message Participants’ attitudes toward
the class selection policy were measured with five 7-point
semantic differential scales. Word pairs included bad/good,
foolish/wise, unfavorable/favorable, negative/positive, undesirable/desirable. These items are in line with Dillard and
Shen (2005), as well as other recent message evaluation research (e.g., Crano et al. 2007; Lienemann & Siegel 2015;
Rosenberg & Siegel 2016). The scale showed adequate reliability in Dillard and Shen’s (2005) data (α = .84 to .89).
Intentions to Contact the President Finally, we also measured
reactance by asking participants to report their freedom restoration intentions—in this case, the likelihood that they would
contact the school President regarding the class selection policy. We assessed participants’ intentions with a three-item
scale: “I am willing to contact [School]‘s President about this

Hypothesis Testing
Perceived Threat As a test of H1a, we used an ANCOVA with
perceived threat as the dependent measure. Age (F[1, 110] =
1.79, p = .18) and gender (F[1, 110] = .02, p = .88) were nonsignificant covariates. We retained age and gender as covariates in all analyses regardless of significance level (for a
discussion see Darlington & Hayes 2016). As predicted, analyses revealed that participants primed to feel threatening uncertainty reported feeling significantly less threatened by the
Table 1

ANCOVA Means, SDs, Fs
Condition

Behavioral Intentions
Perceived Threat
Attitudes Toward Policy
Anger Toward Policy

Uncertain
(n =56)

Certain
(n =55)

F

Partial η2

5.20 (1.56)
5.71 (1.13)
2.24 (1.18)
4.87 (1.89)

5.43 (1.33)
6.08 (0.91)
1.82 (1.05)
5.40 (1.50)

0.61
3.95*
4.02*
2.77

< .01
.04
.04
.03

Note. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. * p < .05
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message than those primed to feel certain (F[1, 110] = 3.95, p
< .05, partial η2 = .04, 95% CI [.001, .77]; see Table 1 for
means and SDs).
Anger toward the Policy As a test of H1b, we again used
ANCOVA with anger toward the class selection policy as
the dependent measure. Age (F[1, 110] = .75, p = .39) and
gender (F[1, 110] = .36, p = .55) were nonsignificant covariates. Results revealed a nonsignificant effect of condition on
anger (F[1, 110] = 2.77, p = .10, partial η2 = .03, 95% CI
[−.10, 1.17]): participants primed to experience threatening
uncertainty reported similar levels of anger at the policy as
those primed to feel certain (see Table 1 for means and SDs).
Attitudes toward the Policy To test H1c, we used an additional
univariate ANCOVA. Age (F[1, 110] = .25, p = .62) and gender (F[1, 110] = .004, p = .95) were nonsignificant covariates.
In support of our prediction, results revealed that participants
primed to feel threatening uncertainty reported significantly
more positive attitudes toward the policy than those primed
to feel certain (F[1, 110] = 4.02, p < .05, partial η2 = .04, 95%
CI [1.53, 2.11]; see Table 1 for means and SDs).
Intentions to Contact the President Finally, we used
ANCOVA to test H2, with intentions to contact the
President as the dependent measure. Age (F[1, 110] = .65,
p = .42) and gender (F[1, 110] = .29, p = .59) were nonsignificant covariates. Results did not support H2, as the intentions
of participants primed to feel threatening uncertainty did not
significantly differ from those primed to feel certain (F[1,
110] = .61, p = .44, 95% CI [−.33, .76]; see Table 1 for means
and SDs).

Auxiliary Mediation Analysis
After finding support for H1a and H1c, we conducted a post
hoc auxiliary mediation analysis. Specifically, we tested
whether perceived threat as well as anger and attitudes toward
the policy would mediate the relationship between uncertainty
and participants’ intentions to contact the President. In other
words, we proposed that the effect of uncertainty on intentions
was associated with diminished feelings of threat and anger, as
well as more positive attitudes. We employed the SPSS macro
PROCESS (Hayes 2013), which uses bootstrap estimation of
conditional indirect effects (see Hayes 2013; Preacher
et al. 2007), to test whether threat, anger, and attitudes mediated the effect of condition on participants’ intentions to contact the President (see Table 2).
Results of the mediation analysis revealed a nonsignificant
relationship between the condition (i.e., uncertain/certain) and
freedom restoration intentions (B = .15, SE = .22, t(114) = .69,
p = .49). However, data revealed significant relationships between condition (i.e., uncertain/certain) and two of the

proposed mediators: perceived threat (B = −.38, SE = .19,
t(114) = −1.99, p < .05) and attitudes toward the policy
(B = .42, SE = .21, t(114) = 2.01, p < .05). The relationship between condition and the third proposed mediator, anger, was
nonsignificant (B = −.53, SE = .32, t(114) = −1.66, p = .10).
These relationships indicate that participants in the uncertain
condition reported significantly less threat and significantly
more positive attitudes, than those in the certain condition.
Further, perceived threat (B = .38, SE = .18, t(114) = 2.12,
p < .05) and attitudes toward the policy (B = −.36, SE = .15,
t(114) = −2.32, p < .05) were significant predictors of
intentions—greater perceived threat and more negative attitudes were associated with greater reactance, as measured by
intentions to contact the President. Based on 10,000
bootstrapped samples, the estimate of the indirect effect of
condition on intentions through perceived threat, anger, and
attitudes was significant (indirect effect = −.36, Boot SE = .18,
95% CI = [−.75, −.02]). The final model (i.e., with condition,
threat, anger, and attitudes entered into the model as predictors) was significant, and accounted for 40% of the variance
(R2 = .40, F[6, 107] = 11.72, p < .001) in intentions to contact
the President (see Fig. 1). In other words, feeling uncertain
influenced the way in which people perceived controlling
messages, which in turn was associated with the amount of
reactance they displayed, as measured by intentions to contact
the President.

Discussion
In outlining PRT, Brehm (1966) was clear that people do not
seek out freedom, but rather experience the motivational state
of reactance when something threatens or eliminates their
freedom. An abundance of empirical data (e.g., Dillard &
Shen 2005; Engs & Hanson 1989), reviews (e.g., Brehm &
Brehm 1981; Sittenthaler et al. 2015), and meta-analyses (e.g.,
Rains 2013) support PRT’s central contentions. A growing
body of research has begun to examine the motivational and
emotional states that influence reactance arousal, including
depression (Lienemann & Siegel 2015), empathy
(Shen 2010, 2011), and self-affirmation (Schüz et al. 2013;
for review see Rosenberg & Siegel 2018). In line with these
recent findings, the current aim was to examine the role of
threatening uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty that is aversive,
arousing insecurity and anxiety; Haas & Cunningham 2014;
Hart 2014) as an additional motivational and emotional state
that moderates reactance arousal. Drawing theoretical support
from Fromm (1941), as well as more recent work by Hogg
(2007) and Kay et al. (2015), we hypothesized that feelings of
threatening uncertainty would diminish the noxious effects
that freedom threats have on people.
We tested this proposition in a single experiment, randomly
assigning students to experience uncertainty (vs. certainty),

Curr Psychol
Table 2 Direct and indirect
effects of the PROCESS
mediation model

Regression Path

Coefficient B

Bootstrapped SE

BCa 95% CI

Direct effects
Condition ➔ Intentions
Condition ➔ Perceived threat
Condition ➔ Attitudes
Condition ➔ Anger

.15
−.38**
.42**
−.55

.22
.19
.21
.32

−.29; .59
−..77; −.001
.005; .84
−1.17; .10

.38**
−.36**
.12

.18
.15
.12

.03; .74
−.66; −.05
−.11; .35

−.36
−.15
−.15
−.06

.18
.10
.11
.08

−.75; −.02
−.37; .01
−.42; .01
−.25; .05

Perceived threat ➔ Intentions
Attitudes ➔ Intentions
Anger ➔ Intentions
Indirect effects
Total
Condition ➔ Threat ➔ Intentions
Condition ➔ Attitudes ➔ Intentions
Condition ➔ Anger ➔ Intentions

Note. Bootstrapped estimates of 10,000. B represents unstandardized effect. β represents standardized effect,
**p < .05

then presenting them with a controlling message espousing a
new policy that would remove their freedom of choice in class
selection the following semester. Results were generally supportive of hypotheses: participants primed to feel threatening
uncertainty (vs. certainty) reported feeling significantly less
threat and more positive attitudes toward the new policy. We
failed to find a direct effect of exposure to the policy on participants’ anger or intentions to contact the President, a null
Fig. 1 Perceived Threat, Anger,
and Attitudes Mediating the
Effect of Condition on Intentions.
Note. p < .05**, p < .01*** (twotailed). The test underneath the
path from condition to
restoration intentions is
controlling for the effect of
perceived threat. Commonly
known as the c’path

result that is in line with other studies in this area (e.g., Quick
& Bates 2010). However, a post hoc auxiliary mediation analysis offered potential insight into this null finding—
threatening uncertainty decreased threat and resulted in more
positive attitudes, which were associated with intentions to
contact the President.
The present research indicated that people experiencing
threatening uncertainty evaluated freedom and a freedom
Perceived Threat

Attitudes

Anger

B = -.21, SE = .27
Condition

Restoration Intentions
B = .15, SE = .22
Total indirect
effect = -.36 (95%
CI: -.75, .02)
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threat differently than those who felt certain and secure. These
findings are in line with Fromm’s (1941) theorizing, as well as
Hogg’s (2007) scholarship examining group-relevant behavior; they have theoretical implications for PRT as well as practical implications for health communication research. The current results indicated that when people felt threatening uncertainty, a freedom threat aroused significantly less threat and
more positive attitudes than those among who felt certain. In
addition, mediation analysis revealed that by affecting these
proximal factors, people’s level of threatening uncertainty was
also associated with their freedom restoration intentions.
Taken together, these findings suggest that threatening uncertainty should be added to the list of motivational and emotional states that hold sway over processes associated with
reactance.

fatigue (e.g., Adams & Umbach 2012) we only measured
anger. In subsequent studies in this line of research, both components of reactance should be measured to ensure that the
findings replicate.
An additional limitation is that although the auxiliary mediation models causality (i.e., uncertainty affects perceived
threat, anger, and attitudes, which in turn affect intentions),
the only causal relationships that the experimental design
assessed are the impact of the manipulation on participants’
attitudes and perceived threat. To contend with this limitation,
future studies should take a longitudinal approach to modeling
reactance processes and outcomes (e.g., Missotten et al. 2018;
Thrasher et al. 2016).

Conclusion
Limitations and Future Directions
There were several limitations to the current research. First,
we used one sample (i.e., college students), one experimental
manipulation (i.e., the autobiographical recall task), and one
message context (i.e., course selection). Together,
this suggests that our findings could be unique to this specific
experimental context rather than a generalizable phenomenon.
Another limitation relates to the experimental prime itself—
even though research suggests that these autobiographical
recall tasks are effective at arousing the intended state (e.g.,
D’Mello & Mills 2014), including uncertainty (e.g., Hogg
et al. 2007; Rast et al. 2013), future studies examining the
influence of motivational and emotional states on reactance
processes should use other methods of inducing uncertainty,
such as video (e.g., Hogg et al. 2010) or laboratory tasks (e.g.,
Mullin & Hogg 1999). An additional limitation is that even
though this experiment clearly indicates people’s level of certainty or uncertainty will influence their responses to controlling messages, we are unsure of the extent to which the current
findings are due to people becoming less reactant when they
are uncertain or more reactant when they are certain. More
studies are necessary to disentangle these effects (e.g., including a control group).
Two additional, related limitations have to do with the
operationalization of reactance in the current study. For one,
we exclusively used self-report dependent measures; although
they result in valid and reliable data (for a meta-analysis see
Rains 2013), Rosenberg and Siegel (2018) recently noted that
measurement of reactance processes is moving beyond selfreport. Future studies should include other indicators of reactance, including physiological measures (e.g., heart rate,
Sittenthaler et al. 2015). Moreover, even though many communication scholars have recently begun to assess reactance
as a combination of anger and negative cognitions (for a metaanalysis see Rains 2013), owing to concerns about survey

There has been a recent and renewed interest in the motivational and emotional states that moderate psychological reactance (e.g., Lienemann & Siegel, 2015; Schüz et al. 2013). In
the current study, we sought to complement these efforts.
Although we conducted only one study, using one manipulation, the results of the current study support the possibility that
feelings of certainty or uncertainty can influence reactance
arousal. The current data add to a growing body of literature
that highlights the utility of examining the role of motivational
and emotional states in heightening or mitigating the effects of
threats to people’s freedom (e.g., Arnow et al. 2003; Belanger
et al. 2020; Lienemann & Siegel 2015; Shen 2010, 2011).
Moreover, considering these findings alongside early theories
about people’s desire to escape freedom (Fromm 1941), as
well as modern empirical work (Hogg 2007; Kay
et al. 2015), indicates that it may be worth reconsidering
Brehm’s (1966) original axiom that freedom threats always
arouse psychological reactance. Ideally, the current results
will catalyze additional investigations into the motivational
and emotional states that amplify and curtail psychological
reactance.
Data Availability Statement Raw data are available on the
Open Science Framework and can be accessed here: https://
bit.ly/2YK7Odx.

Appendix 1: Experimental Manipulation
Part 1
“To begin, we would like you to think of a recent time when
something happened to you that made you feel very [uncertain/certain] about yourself, your life, your future, or your
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place in the world. A time when you felt very [vulnerable and
threatened/certain and secure].
This should be an event that happened recently and had a
powerful effect on you; one that still makes you feel very
[uncertain/certain] about yourself right now.
First, we would like to ask you to describe this [uncertain
and threatening/certain and secure] event. For this part of the
task, do not tell us how it made you feel; instead, try to write as
if you were a journalist focusing on the specific details of what
occurred. On the next page, we will ask you about how this
event made you feel. At that point, we hope you will tell us all
about every emotion that you felt. Please spend 2 min on this
part of the task.
Remember, you must write for 2 min before moving onto
the next page.
First, in the box below, please describe this certain and
secure event in as much detail as possible. What exactly happened? Was anyone else involved? If so, who?”

Part 2
“Now, please describe how you felt at the time of this [uncertain and vulnerable/certain and secure] event.
Please try to describe all the feelings that you experienced.
As you write, try to re-experience the emotions that you felt at
the time of the event. The more you can experience those
emotions once again, the better.
Remember, you must write for 2 min before moving onto
the next page.”

Appendix 2: Class Selection Message
Intro
On the next page, you will see a brief message from top
[School] administrators, who are considering drastic changes
to the way in which students select classes each semester. The
administration has tasked us with gathering information about
students’ perceptions of this proposed new policy.
Please read the message closely, as we will ask you some
questions afterwards.

Message
New Restrictions on Class Selection.
Top [School] administrators are considering a plan that
would remove just about all of student control over class selection. In short, rather than you choosing your classes, your
classes will be chosen for you.
Starting in Fall 2018, this new proposal would eliminate
the vast majority of your say in class selection within your
major. The freedom of choice students used to enjoy will no

longer exist. If the administration approves this plan, all
[School] students would be forced to declare their major by
second semester freshman year. After that, students would
only be free to choose one class each year – academic advisors
would mandate all other class selections. You will no longer
be the final decision maker when it comes to your course
schedule.
Put simply, this plan would eliminate nearly all the freedom
of choice you have about the classes that you take.
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